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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

******
PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, a Utah cooperative
association,
Plaintiff - Respondent.

CASE NO. 15388

vs.
ZANE CHRISTENSON,
Defendant - Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Producers Livestock Marketing Association, plaintiff-appellee
herein, pursuant to the terms of Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitions the court for rehearing of the above matter.
Plaintiff-appellee respectfully submits that the court erred in
its decision filed on November 27, 1978 in the following particulars:
1.

The decision herein that a joint venture continued

between the parties is based on disputed facts not preponderating
aga~nst

the lower court's findings.

Therefore, reversal would
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be an inappropriate usurpation of the trial court's discretion.
2.

The record does not support a finding of joint venture

ln the feeding of the cattle.
3.

The direction of the plurality opinion to adjust

the loss between the parties cannot be followed because
the record is unclear as to how apportionment is to be made.
Respectfully submitted this

/q~day

of December, 1978.

ARHSTRONG, RAWLINGS, WEST
& SCHAERRER
Ben E. Rawlings
James R. Morgan
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellee
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Cooperative
Association,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
CASE NO. 15388

vs.
ZANE CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR RBHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Producers Livestock Marketing Association,
filed a tiVo-count complaint against the defendant, Zane Christensen, to recover moneys paid to defendant on drafts drawn on
plaintiff by defendant.

Defendant answered

t~e

complaint ad-

mitting receipt of the money but, by way of counterclaim, sought
a set-off and accounting on five specific business transactions.
The case was tried in the District Court, sitting without
a jury, and judgment was rendered to plaintiff on each count of
the complaint.

The trial court denied recovery on all counts of

defendant's counterclaim except one, which is not before this
court on appeal.

Defendant apcealed.

On November 27, 1978,

this court, in a divided opinion, reversed the judgment on Count I
of defendant's counterclaim, finding that the parties had been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

joint venturers in a cattle purchase which resulted in a substantial loss and that plaintiff should share in the loss.
The record herein reveals that olaintiff is a cooperat 1
livestock marketing association and that defendant, in additic·
to being an extensive cattle owner and dealer, since 1948 had
been associated with plaintiff i11 ::he purchase and sale of cat:.
(TR 26-28;

122-125).

That association included not only buy::.:

and selling cattle to each other, or on a commission basis, k
also joint venturing together on cattle transactions (TR26-23,
122-125; 140-143).

The subject of the counterclaim filed by defendant

a~

the plurality's opinion 1vas the purchase of aporoximately 2W
head of calves from the Ute Tribal Livestock Association in F
In that transaction, a three-way partnership was formed betwee·
plaintiff, defendant and a third party.

The cattle were pure:·

but due to the high purchase price and falling cattle market,:
cattle could not be sold without sustaining a loss.

Therefore

the three-way partnership ended and Waitt Cattle Company pure:.•
994 head reimbursing plaintiff a proportionate share of the~

chase price

(TR 54;

279).

Thereafter, the decision was rna~~·

place the balance of the cattle in a feedlot in Delta, Utah.
cattle were subsequently repurchased with a loss on the totai
transaction of approximately $210,000.00

(TR 54-56, 61-62,

6

>

159-161).

The trial court found that defendant acted alone in "
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'

the cattle in a feedlot and therefore plaintiff was not liable
for a partnership share of the loss sustained.

The plurality

opinion reverses the trial court's finding and in substitution
thereof, finds inter alia that a joint venture continued between
the parties and that plaintiff should share in the loss in the
same prooortion that over the years the parties had split gains.
Plaintiff-Appellee moves for rehearing, respectfully urging
that the plurality opinion reversing the trial court's decision
was in err because it is based upon disputed facts not clearly
preponderating against the trial court's findings and therefore,
a reversal would be an inappropriate usurpation of the trial
court's discretion.

Further, if the plurality opinion is left

standing, it would create serious inconsistencies in the law of
joint venture and of appellate review.
ARGUMENT
THE DECISION HEREIN THAT A JOINT VENTURE CONTINUED
BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS BASED ON DISPUTED FACTS NOT
PREPONDERATING AGAINST THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS.
THEP£FORE, REVERSAL WOULD BE AN INAPPROPRIATE USURPATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND A REHEARING
SHOULD BE GRANTED.
Long standing legal precedence in this jurisdiction holds,
in an equity case, that the trial court's findings will not be
disturbed "unless as a matter of law.
find as did the fact finder."
708 (1977).

. . no one could reasonably

Canesecca vs. Canesecca, 572 P.2d

The obvious reason for such precedence is the unique

position of the trial court in hearing testimony and receiving
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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evidence.

Nokes v. Continental Mining and Milling co., 6 u~-

2d 177, 178;

308 P.2d 954,

955

(1957).

The majority opinion reverses the trial court based ~
the oral testimony of the defendant and a witness, J. L. Line;
(Lindsay) , whose testimony the trial court found to be unrel~
The record reveals many inconsistencies and bias lvhich suppor:
the trial court's rulings.
1.

There is evidence that the witness, J. L. Linds~,

was prejudiced against tl-Je plaintiff.

The record reflects tk

Lindsay was fired from plaintiff's employ because he would no:
follow plaintiff's management directives

(TR 220-224).

That

disregard for plaintiff's directives was clearly evidenced in
Lindsay's failure to obtain management approval for feedlot
operations and Lindsay's refusal to clean up cattle transactic·
to avoid the very type of transaction at issue
224).

(TR 149-154, 2:

It seems rather clear that if Lindsay disregarded his

employer

while employed, that he would be hostile to his emc:

after being fired.
2.

There is evidence that the witness, J. L.

Linds~,

interested in the outcome of the litigation because of his cS
ing business relationshiP with defendant.

There is ample ev1:,

in the record that Lindsay was interested in the outcome of~
litigation because he continues to do business with defen~m
(TR 28, 103-104, 129, 138, 167-168).

Lindsay and defendant~,

fied that they had personal dealings as well as dealings thr:.
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third party, Waitt Cattle Company.
3.

Lindsay's testimony was inconsistent and impeached

on several points which were germane to defendant's theory of
partnership.

During cross-examination Lindsay displayed an

in-

ability to recall S?ecifics of the cattle transaction in question
or incredible inability to clarify deal sheets even though the
record reveals that Lindsay supervised the deal sheet preparation
(TR 128-130, 131, 152-154), the most significant of which was
Lindsay's inability to identify the ultimate sale of the cattle
to Wheatheart (TR 158-162).
Lindsay's testimony was also clearly impeached on several
specific points.

Pressing Lindsay as to why the deal sheet in

question did not reflect an ongoing transaction, Lindsay incredibly explained that the deal had been "cleaned up" but that
plaintiff would participate in the buy back (TR 130, 148-160).
This testimony was directly in conflict with that of Joe Jacobs,
general manager for plaintiff, who testified that a "cleaned up
deal" meant that it was a totally completed transaction (TR 219220) •

Similarly, Lindsay testified that there was an agreement
with defendant to repurchase the subject calves but his statements
to plaintiff's personnel were in direct conflict and impeached.
Significantly, Lindsay's position reversed as soon as he was no
longer employed by plaintiff but maintaining a business relationship with defendant (TR 208-210).
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In light of the foregoing,

it cannot be said that the

trial court's finding as a matter of law was so devoid of su":·
that reasonable men could not have found as the trial court ~:
and therefore, rehearino should be granted.
II.

THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF JOINT
VENTURE IN THE FEEDING OF THE CATTLE AND THEREFORE REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED.

The majority opinion found as follows:
"A joint venture should remain joint whether it
results in a gain or in a loss, unless the parties
otherwise contract.
The record does not reveal
any contract other than a joint venture."(Slip Op.4)
This court in Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 19741,
set forth the standard for a joint venture as follows:
"The requirements for the (joint venture) relationship
are not exactly defined, but certain elements are
essential: The parties must coMbine their property,
money, effects, skill, labor and knowledge. As a
general rule, there must be a community of interest
in the performance of the common purpose, a joint
proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual
right to control, a right to share in the profits and
unless there is an agreement to the contrary a duty
to share in any losses which may be sustained." Id. at:
l.

feedlot.

The defendant acted alone in placing the cattle i:1:
Clearly, at the point that the decision is made to::,

the cattle in a feedlot,
of joint venture.

there is not evidence supporting a ::·.

There is evidence and the trial court foo~

partnership in the purchase.

However, after the cattle were::

chased, it is clear that that partnership was terminated,
Waitt Cattle Company ourchasing approximately one-half of t~e
cattle.

Significantly, impeaching testimon::· i:-1 t'1e record re"''
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that the one-half of the head purchased by Waitt was the plaintiff's
half and the defendant took his share to a feedlot (TR 206-207).
At that point there was not "a combination of property, money,
effects, skill, labor and knowledge", because the record reflects
that defendant acted along from that point as evidenced by the
following facts:
(a)

Defendant alone contacted the operators of

the feedlot and plaintiff was not represented during
the negotiations.
(b)

The written feedlot agreement was between

defendant and the feedlot operators, with no mention
that plaintiff had an interest in the cattle.
(c)

Defendant arranged for and paid the freight

on the calves to and from the feedlot out of his own
funds.
(d)

Defendant arranged for and paid the balance

of the purchase price on March 30, 1974 approximately
two and one-half months before the transaction was
actually completed.
(e)

Defendant comingled the calves with his own

calves in the feedlot and maintained part of the calves
on his own ranch even though the balance could have been
liquidated through plaintiff's auction (TR 53-66, 110113, 238-245)

0

Clearly, there was no combination of property, money, skill, labor
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or knowledge in the transaction required in a joint venture

the trail court rightly held that defendant acted alone inc;,
the cattle in a feedlot.
2.

There is evidence in the record of a contract of s;

to defendant.

The plurality opinion states that there is no;

dence of any contract except a joint venture.

HoHever, the ::.

court noted with interest the 1972 Ute Indian deal wherein a
portion of the calves purchased were placed in inventory and
subsequently paid for by defendant •.vith no accounting for prc:.
even though it had been a orofitable market (TR 274-278).

I:

also evident that the defendant J?Urchased cattle from plaint;:
on his own account and that there was an ongoing customer re:;
tionship between the parties as well as the partnership (TR 2'
267-270,

272, 281).

In light of the defendant' failure to ac:'

for profits on the 1972 transaction, it becomes questionab~
whether defendant would have voluntarily reopened the "cleane:
deal" had there been a orofit realized on the 1973 transacuc·
Perhaps the most helpful testimony on plaintiff's leg;.
responsibility to share in the loss was Lindsay's own testi~.c
which, read in context, reveals that plaintiff's obligatioo~
more a moral than legal obligation when he stated in response
the following question:
Q.

Now,

it was your testimony that there would be a

settlin~ up at some ooint because you wanted to
help Zane recoup his losses,

is that correct?
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A.

I said there would be a settling uo because I
felt like we had participated in enough profit
in all the other years and all other deals that
we should participate in this one also.

(TR 158)

Because of defendant's own independent operation and the
fact that he acted alone on all critical points of the feedlot
phase of the transaction, a rehearing should be granted.
III.

1.

THE DIRECTION OF THE PLURALITY TO ADJUST THE
LOSS BETivEEN THE PARTIES CANNOT BE FOLLOWED
BECAUSE THE RECO~D IS UNCLEAR AS TO HOI-l THE
ADJUST}ffiNT IS TO BE MADE.
The testimony is unclear as to how an adjustment for

losses should be made.

Testimony in the record is in conflict as

to how the losses should be divided.

Significantly, the testimony

in conflict is between the two individuals upon which the plurality
bases its opinion.

Defendant testified that profits were divided

approximately equally after taking out weighing charges, feed costs,
freight charges, and that the decision was made between himself and
Lindsay (TR 46-47, 94-95).
these factors,

However, Lindsay testified that all

including interest costs, would enter into his

decision on defendant's split and that on occasion defendant had
nothing coming (TR 133, 135-136, 141-143, 163, 165).

Of particular

importance is the testimony of Lindsay concerning how they allocated
losses.

On this point Linday testified as follows:
Q.

Have you, in yo·1r ether course of dealings had
any transactions that sustained a loss?

A.

Oh, yes.
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Q.

And what would happen in those instances?

A.

Well, sometimes we would pay and sometimes we
would carry it on.

We had 25 years of good

business relationship and it wasn't too many
times that we hadn't gotten even.
Q.

Were there many times that you had taken a loss
of profits.

A.

Not too darn many.

Q.

And were there instances where you would carry
them on for a period of time just as you were
suggesting here?

A.

Yes, yes.

Q.

And work them out?

A.

Yes (TR 133).

Thus, it is clear that the parties >vould attempt to rec:
losses in subsequent transactions.

A requirement that the tr:

court apportion the losses cannot be done from the record beca.
at least one year of transactions occurred between the partie;
during which time much or all of the loss could have been equo.
as evidenced by the Wheatheart transaction in the record wheri
defendant received approximately all of the profit (TR 161).
2.

Any loss apportioned to plaintiff should be the~

incurred at the time the cattle 1vere Placed in a feedlot.

?::

tiff's position is that there should be no aoportionment of:·
loss. However, because neither majority or minority

opinio~s
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address this issue, the following should be submitted to assist
the trial court in apportioning the loss.
It is clear that defendant and Lindsay, in placing the
cattle in the feedlot, were acting in direct contravention of
management directives because no authorization was obtained for
the feedlot operation and

Lindsay was being pressured to clear

off any inventory (TR 148-151, 211-215).

It seems inconceivable

that over the course of many years and thousands of transactions
defendant would be unaware of those directives.
If, however, defendant was unaware of the authorization
requirement, Utah law would impute such knowledge to defendant.
See:

Section 48-1-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
During the course of the trial, plaintiff submitted evidence

through its accountant that had the cattle been sold just after
purchase, there would have been a loss sustained.

By using the

sale of a larger number of less desirable cattle approximately
equal weights, the accountant computed that the loss which would
have been sustained would have approximated $124,000.00 instead
of the nearly $210,000.00 loss actually sustained (TR 283-289).
Plaintiff submits that if the court is inclined to apportion
loss, it should be that loss sustained when the three-way partnership was terminated and not the loss incurred as a result of the
feedlot operation over which it had no actual control.
CONCLUSION
The record contains disputed facts which do not clearly
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preponderate against the trial court's findings, and
plaintiff

res~ectfully

there~n

urges that rehearing be granted.

DATED this 18th day of December, 1978.
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, \vEST & SCH;q
By BEN E. RAWLINGS
JAMES R. MORGAN
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellees
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